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Abstract: With an absence ex-post income risk coping mechanisms such as risk pooling in social networks and inter-temporal 
consumption smoothing mechanism, Chinese farmers depend heavily on ex-ante mechanisms to cope with income risk. Based on 
survey data collected on 1063 peasant households in Sichuan province, this paper tests how ex-ante risk coping mechanisms 
affect farmers’ behavior and welfare. The result indicates that: the conservative production strategy and the diversified strategy 
play the most important role in farmers’ reducing income fluctuations; but it causes the low efficiency and widens the income 
gap between the poor and the rich.
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1. Introduction
The rural reform in late 1970s has not only provided farmers with production and operational independence, but 
also made them the subjects to undertake risks. As the mode of agricultural production and farming operation is 
special, farmers have to face the impact of multiple risks. To address the fluctuations in income resulted from 
various risks, farmers can make use of formal and informal risk mechanisms to deal with income risks. Formal risk 
response mechanisms mean that the formal system arrangements for risk management, mainly including the modern 
social security and commercial insurance; informal risk coping mechanisms mean that risk aversion measures other 
than the formal coping mechanisms, mainly including the risk pooling in the social network, inter-temporal 
consumption smoothing and all approaches taken by farmers in the production process to avoid the risk. At present, 
the development of formal risk coping mechanisms focusing on the modern social security and commercial 
insurance is generally at a low level in rural areas. Therefore, in the context of the basic lack of formal risk coping
mechanism, farmers rely largely on informal risk aversion mechanisms to cope with income fluctuations. In terms of 
the time income risk happens, informal risk response mechanisms can be divided into ex-ante risk coping
mechanism and ex-post risk coping mechanism. The former refers to risk prevention measures that farmers take in 
the course of production before the income risk occurs, mainly including the conservative strategies of production 
and management and diverse production strategies; the latter means risk coping measures that farmers take after the 
occurrence of income risks, mainly including the risk pooling in social networks and inter-temporal consumption 
smoothing. Under conditions that the credit market and insurance market develop adequately, the ex-post risk 
response mechanism will not bring economic efficiency losses and thus become a relatively ideal method of risk 
management. Unfortunately, farmers are subject to multiple limits in the use of ex-post risk response mechanism to
deal with income fluctuation, which makes the mechanism functionally limited. Therefore, a rational farmer has to 
take preventive measures to avoid the risk before the occurrence. However, the ex-ante mechanism will bring many 
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negative results, such as inhibiting innovation in agricultural production; reducing the degree of specialization of 
farmers’ production and hindering the constant increase of economic efficiency. Even worse, once the ex-ante 
mechanism can not resist the impact of income risks, farmers would be forced to be directly exposed to risks, thus 
passively suffering the adverse consequences resulted from income reduction, such as giving up the children’s 
educational opportunities, lowering the standard of living, delaying the treatment of diseases, and sale of productive 
assets, etc. which would obviously undermine farmers’ long-term productive efficiency. As poor farmers are more 
easily exposed to the risk directly, they are more easily caught in the conditions of long-term low efficiency, which 
will lead to a vicious cycle of poverty and widen the gap between the rich and the poor. Currently, it is of great 
significance to understand the risk response measure taken by farmers spontaneously and its impact on production 
and operation, in order to help farmers cope with risks at lower cost and thus increase agricultural productivity and 
welfare level of farmers.
The research on farmers risk coping mechanisms makes a very important field in development economics. Based 
on foreign scholars’ research, it is found that after the occurrence of future income risk, farmers in developing 
countries will adopt the risk pooling in social networks and inter-temporal consumption smoothing to cope with 
income fluctuations. Bardhan and Udry [1] discovered that the risk pooling in social networks and inter-temporal 
consumption smoothing is a traditional way for farmers to lessen the income fluctuation. Farmers can share in
income risk of each other through income transfers and swap credits characterized by state contingent in the social 
network with geographical and blood relationship as the bridge; inter-temporal consumption smoothing is applied to 
deal with risks mainly by achieving the inter-temporal transfer of income with the savings and loans in the financial 
market. Nevertheless, according to the research made by Fafchamps [2], it is found that ex-post risk coping
mechanisms are limited in multiple ways. The main problem facing the risk pooling within the social network lies 
where the social network size is limited, and where its internal problems in implementation are against the 
information. Rosenzweig and Wolpin [3] discovered that inter-temporal consumption smoothing is often subject to 
the limit of less developed financial market. For this reason, even if farmers take the foregoing ex-post risk coping
mechanisms to deal with income risks, the effect is limited. In case that the income smoothing conducted after the 
crisis is functionally limited, farmers in developing countries will take precautionary measures to avoid the income 
risk before it occurs. The ex-ante risk coping mechanisms take the main form of the conservative production 
strategy and diversified strategy, which refers to that farmers may diversify the sources of income as much as 
possible, as long as the different sources of income are not perfectly correlated, and the combination of these sources 
will reduce the total income risk. The conservative production strategy means that farmers take part in the low-risk
and low-return production activities as possible as practically. Relative to ex-post risk management mechanisms, the
ex-ante risk reaction mechanism depends on farmers' own choice, subject to smaller external constraints, and thus 
can help farmers to avoid the income risk to a certain extent. However, the ex-ante risk coping mechanism reduces 
the degree of agricultural specialization, delays the progress of agricultural technology, thus leading to a decline in 
productive efficiency and income. Morduch [4] discovered that farmers who have adopted the ex-ante mechanism 
have to measure between reduced income and risk, which is the main factor limiting the ex-ante mechanism.
There are also a number of scholars who studied the risk response mechanisms adopted by farmers. The research
by Chen and Ding [5] shows that Chinese farmers, like other farmers in developing countries, deal with income risks 
through risk pooling and inter-temporal consumption smoothing in the social network; their research also discuss the 
impact of the social capital of rural households on risk pooling in the social network. In the empirical research made 
by Luo [6] on the relationship between health risks and consumer behavior in poverty-stricken areas, the relation 
between risk response mechanisms and farmers consumption smoothing is discussed. He inspected the relation 
between health risks and consumption fluctuation, and thus proved that farmers have a very strong consumption 
smoothing capacity. Fan and Yuan [7] conducted a research on the effect of the urban-rural income risk on 
consumption of durable goods, and found that durable goods consumption of rural residents are more sensitive than 
urban residents to income risks; in the research, it is pointed out that it is of great importance to establish the rural 
social security system to improve the welfare level of farmers. Gan and Xu Lixin [8] made a rigorous research on
consumption insurance, and the research examined the impact of risk response mechanisms on farmers’ ability of 
consumption smoothing through the introduction of cross variable. And Ma and Bai [9] tested the effect of the ex-
post risk response mechanism on income fluctuations of farmers by use of survey data of Shaanxi farmers. The 
results show that the risk co-ordination and inter-temporal consumption smoothing mechanism in the social network
play a part in addressing the income risk for farmers to some extent.
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There has been some research that mainly shows whether or to what extent there are in a variety of ex-post risk 
response mechanisms in rural areas of China; however, the research failed to conduct a careful survey on the ex-ante 
risk coping mechanisms that farmers generally adopt and was in lack of systematical analysis of the relationship 
between the risk response mechanisms and the production and operation of farmers. In addition, there has been 
some research centering on standard analysis in case of failure to make a rigorous empirical test on how various risk 
response mechanisms play the role in mitigation of farmers’ income fluctuations. To overcome the above-mentioned
shortcomings, the paper uses the survey data based farmers in Sichuan, and seeks to investigate more fully the 
various mechanisms adopted by the farmers to respond to fluctuations in income and their effect on production and 
management decisions of farmers. Through such investigation, this paper attempts to explain: what role different 
risk response mechanisms play in easing the income fluctuation? What methods the farmers prefer to avoid risks,
what factors prevent the farmers from the choice of risk avoidance mechanism? And what the impact of the risk 
coping measures the farmers choose to take on their production and life would be? 
2. Theoretical hypothesis
Investigation shows that farmers of Sichuan mainly take a variety of informal risk coping mechanisms to deal 
with the income risk. However, the use of these mechanisms by the farmers to ease the income risk is faced with
various constraints, of which the size determines the degree of implementation of various risk response mechanisms.
Farmers can deal with the income risk through the risk pooling in the social network. Studies made by Du [10] 
show that the role of village social network with geography relation as the link is gradually weakening. The primary 
social network for a rural family is a network of relatives and friends composed by blood relationship, marriage 
relationship, and no relationship. Such network of relatives and friends is the basis for farmers in China to realize 
the risk pooling in the social network. At the same time, how the risk pooling in the network of relatives and friends 
is achieved is subject to such factors as scale, closeness and support capacity, etc.. Farmer’s network of relatives and 
friends is limited in size, which limits the function of the risk pooling mechanism based on the size of the network of 
relatives and friends. The network of close relatives and friends ensures constrained opportunistic behavior of 
farmers and overcome information and implementation problems. However, in the process of transition to
marketization, the traditional ethical ideas in rural areas are gradually fading away, and the closeness of the network 
of friends and relatives is continuously decreasing, which will cause a negative effect to the risk pooling in the 
network of relatives and friends. Members of the network depend largely on the income of other members in terms 
of the amount of transfer payment that they can receive in the event of risks. Yet, Members of the network share the 
homogeneity in the economic status so that capacity of support of other members is limited. In case of any income 
risk, the total amount of transfer payments that farmers can get from relatives and friends is often very small. Based 
on the foregoing analysis, Hypothesis 1 is proposed that: effects of the risk pooling in the social network depend on 
the size, closeness and support capacity of the network of relatives and friends. Although the risk pooling in the 
network of friends and relatives can help farmers respond to income fluctuation to a certain extent, it is another case 
in rural areas. In the process of marketization of the rural areas, the mobility of the population never stops growing, 
alternative of the market to features of the network of relatives and friends keeps deepening with the traditional 
ethical concepts increasingly weakened. Such factors play down the feature of the risk pooling in the social network, 
thus become functionally limited while helping farmers cope with the role income risk.
Farmers can also deal with the income risk through inter-temporal consumption smoothing mechanism, that is, 
asset accumulation and credit. The research conducted by Hang and Shen [11] shows that the important purpose for
savings of farmers is to prevent uncertainty. Wan [12] discovered that the income level of farmers in China will
economically and statistically make a significant impact on the rate of savings. Recent results from Wang [13] 
indicate that the saving rate of rural population grows with the increase in the income level of farmers. However, the 
actual low-level income of farmers led to generally low rate of savings, thus limiting their capacity to smooth the
fluctuation in income by assets accumulation. From the perspective of credit, the source of loans for farmers 
includes formal and informal credit markets. As the four major state-owned banks are gradually seceding from rural 
credit markets, it is mostly the rural credit association who provides loans to farmers in the rural formal credit 
market. But, Sheng [14] discover that in recent years, loan behavior of rural credit cooperatives has presented 
obvious non-agricultural trend, and the number of loans available to farmers is very limited. In the informal credit 
market, a severe shortage of development exists in the private credit market and informal lenders in rural areas 
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remains illegal or strictly restricted by laws, thus restraining the possibilities that farmers obtain loans from the 
private credit market. According to the above analysis, Hypothesis 2 is proposed that: the income level of farmers 
and the availability of loans from formal and informal credit markets determine the effect of the inter-temporal 
consumption smoothing mechanism. But due to farmers’ current income level and constraints from credit markets,
the inter-temporal consumption smoothing mechanism plays a limited role.
Often in a “deep-enough-to-reach- neck” state, farmers in developing countries tend to avoid the risk in a
stronger sense that common economic entities do. In the basic lack of formal risk management mechanisms and 
under the conditions that the ex-post risk response mechanism is so much restricted, they have to rely more on the 
ex-ante mechanism to avoid the income risk and make careful arrangements for production activities to stabilize the
income. Usually, farmers insist on applying conservative agricultural technologies while keeping very cautious in 
use of new technologies that may potentially increase the profit; farmers often tend to choose those low yielding 
crops that can defend any adverse changes in the weather and cultivate a variety of crops in the land of small scale.
Unfortunately, the ex-ante mechanism will cause negative results. First, the ex-ante mechanism will reduce the 
initiative of farmers to use new technology, so that farmers diversify the low-efficiency operation on the land of 
small size, thus reducing the efficiency of agricultural production. Second, the ex-ante mechanism will widen 
income gaps. As well-off farmers give less considerations to risks in obtaining income, their degree of specialization 
will be higher and will hold a more positive attitude to new technologies and new market opportunities and produce 
higher production and operation efficiency. For poor farmers, the situation is just the opposite. Such a mechanism 
would make repeated effects so as to widen the income gap. Finally, once the ex-ante mechanism fails to cope with 
income risk, farmers may fall into the poverty-stricken trap, causing a vicious cycle of poverty. Based on the above-
said analysis, Hypothesis 3 is proposed that: in the lack of formal risk management mechanisms, against the 
background of restricted ex-post risk response mechanism, farmers will make use of ex-ante mechanisms to avoid 
the income risk, which will result in the loss of efficiency and equity.
3. Data collection and variable selection
3.1. Data source
The data in this study comes from the questionnaire of “farmers’ income risk” project made by the discussion 
group in the rural areas in Sichuan from July to September 2009. The author conducted two pre-surveys to ensure 
that the questionnaire can be understood and accepted by farmers. The formal investigation was made in 9 counties 
and 81 villages in northeastern, middle and southern Sichuan. 15 farmers were randomly selected from each of the
villages for the investigation. In this survey, 1220 copies of the questionnaire were sent out, of which 1129 copies 
were actually regained in total, as part of the questionnaire were invalid, 1,063 copies of valid questionnaires were 
eventually obtained, and the rate of valid questionnaires was 88%.
3.2. Variable selection
In this study, the independent variable is the degree of the income fluctuation as farmers face the risk, that is, the 
change in the normal income caused by risk factors. The ideal method to measure the income fluctuation is to 
review the change in the actual income of farmers via time-series data. However, taking into account the difficulties
in and costs of directly asking farmers the time-series income, this study is designed to measure the income 
fluctuation of farmers with the subjective experience in enduring the income risk. Specifically, the head of a 
household is required to describe the fluctuation in their normal income in the event of relatively more serious risks
(the loss is about one third of the normal annual income) based on their experience with “basically unchanged” and 
“significantly lowered”.
Explanatory variables in this study are mainly divided into three categories: Category I covers the ex-ante risk 
response mechanism variables, such as, conservative production strategy (measured by the attitude to treat new 
technologies and new varieties), diversified strategy (measured by the attitude to simultaneous cultivation or feeding 
of a variety of agricultural products); Category II is the ex-post inter-temporal consumption smoothing variables,
including: degree of development of the formal credit market (measured by the level of difficulty in the access to 
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loans from credit unions or banks), the informal credit market development (measured by the level of difficulty in 
the access to private loans), average household income (total household income divided by population of family);
Category III is the ex-post risk pooling in social network, including the breadth variable of the social network 
(measured with the number of friends and relatives), support capacity of the network of friends and family 
(measured with the number of relatively well-off families among relatives and friends) and the closeness variable of
social network (measured by the status of contact with relatives and friends).
Additionally, we have conducted control on the formal risk response mechanism variables and the farmer family 
characteristics variables. The formal risk response mechanism includes: level of development of commercial 
insurance markets and level of difficulty in the access to government relief. Farmer family characteristics variables 
include: the number of population of a family, the age of heads of households (average age of male and female 
heads of households), the educational background of the heads (average educational level of male and female heads 
of households), the size of per capita cultivated land area and traits of the heads of households. Among them, traits
of the heads of households refer to how the heads of the households are optimistic, and are measured with how often 
the heads consider external accidents. As the optimism level of heads of the households will affect their subjective 
experience in consumption fluctuations, analysis errors caused by the adoption of subjective experience index in this 
paper can be reduced by controlling the character traits of the heads of the households.
Table 1  Explanation, Assignment and Distribution of Variables
Variable name Variable explanation Variable assignment 
Explained variable — —
I fluctuation income fluctuation in case of income 
loss(dichotomous variable)
0= basically unchanged(21.4%)
1= significantly lowered(78.6%)
Formal risk coping mechanism 
variable
— —
CI restrict level of the difficulty in     the access to 
commercial insurance compensation
1= very difficult(19.5%) 2= relatively difficult(40%) 3= 
common(26.5%) 4= relatively easy (10.2%) 5= easy(3.8%)
GR restrict level of the difficulty in the access to 
governmental relief
1= very difficult(31.4%) 2= relatively difficult(36.3%) 3= 
common(24.3%) 4= relatively easy(6.2%) 5= easy(1.8%)
Risk pooling in social network
variable 
— —
SN scale number of relatives and friends 1= very few(2.0%) 2= relatively few(8.4%) 3= 
common(45.5%) 4= relatively many(27.2%) 5= quite 
many(16.9%)
SN income number of well-off family among relatives 
and friends
1= a few(51.1%) 2= common(43.8%) 3= many(5.1%)
SN quality status of contact with relatives and friends 1= very bad (5.7%) 2= relatively bad(6.4%) 3= 
common(31.5%) 4= relatively good(41.2) 5= very 
good(15.2%)
inter-temporal consumption 
smoothing mechanism variable 
— —
FC restrict level of the difficulty in the access to loans 
from the formal credit market
1= very difficult(30.2%) 2= relatively difficult(46.5%) 3= 
common(15.6%) 4= relatively  easy(6.9%) 5= very 
easy(0.8%)
IC restrict level of the difficulty in the access to loans 
from the informal credit market
1= very difficult(13.4%) 2= relatively difficult(29.1%) 3= 
common(37.7%) 4= relatively  easy (14.7%) 5= very 
easy(5.1%)
H income average income level of a family (ten thousand Yuan)
Ex-ante risk coping mechanism 
variable
— —
CP strategy attitude to the adoption of new technologies 
and varieties
1= always (3.8%) 2= very often (8.3%) 3= cautious(53.6%)
4= seldom(26.2%) 5= never(8.1%)
DP strategy attitude to simultaneous cultivation or 1= always(41.8%) 2= very often(31.6%) 3= cautious(11.3%)
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feeding of a variety of agricultural products 4= seldom(8.2%) 5= never(7.1%)
Family characteristic variable — —
Character whether often consider the future potential 
accidents or not
1= over often(15.3%) 2= sometimes (49.4%) 3= seldom
(25.6%) 4= never(9.7%)
Age age of the head of a household (years old)
H population number of population of a family (person)
Land per capita cultivated land (mu)
Leader whether the family has any rural cadre or 
not
0= no(90.1%) 1= yes(9.9%)
Education educational background of the head of a 
household
(year)
Note: The percentage included in brackets is that of each assignment accounts for of all the samples. 
4. Model Selection and Estimation Method
Dependent variables of this study are dichotomous variables, and regression analysis is conducted by use
of dichotomous logistic method. The explanatory variables in this study are mostly ordered categorical variables, for 
such variables, one method to deal with them is to change each multi-category qualitative variable into a number 
of dichotomous qualitative variables. However, data in this study is derived from the questionnaire and most of the 
explanatory variables are ordered categorical variables, in case they are changed into a number of dichotomous
qualitative variables, there will be too many final variables, which is not conducive to a clear explanation. Another 
method set out in the Social Science Research to deal with ordered categorical variables is to give each option of 
variables a certain value and use the variables as continuous ones. The model this approach describes is relatively 
simple and easy to explain. However, this approach requires assignment to be the same with the actual size as much 
as possible, to avoid bias caused by improper assignment. As the questionnaire of this study is designed to classify
the ordered categorical variables in details, and attention has been paid to the distance set option so as to avoid 
improper assignment, this paper adopts the latter method for analysis. For assignment of each specific variable, see
Table 1. To conduct the analysis, this paper adopts the quantitative analysis model as follows:
LN(pi/1-pi)=D0+D1Xi+D2Yi+D3Zi+D4Wi+D5Ci+H i
ipOf which , indicates the probability of significantly reduced income, 1 ip- indicates that the probability 
that income does not significantly reduce, and / (1 )i ip p- indicates the odds ratio of significantly reduced 
income, that is, the probability of significantly reduced income divided by the basically unchanged income. 0D is a
constant. iX indicates the set of ex-ante risk response mechanisms, iY indicates the set of risk pooling mechanisms
in social networks, iZ indicates the set of inter-temporal consumption smoothing mechanism variable, iW indicates 
the set of formal risk response mechanism variables, and iC indicates the set of family characteristics variables. 
1D , 2D , 3D , 4D and 5D are respectively the sets of corresponding variables. iH is a random error term.
5. Results and Analysis
In this study, stata9.0 software is adopted for logit regression analysis, and of 1063 effective samples, there are in
total 1018 samples included in regression process. Results from the measurement test are shown in Table 2. In the 
process of the measurement test, in order to understand the robustness of the results and under the constant control 
of family characteristics, variables of formal risk response mechanism, risk pooling mechanism in social network,
inter-temporal consumption smoothing mechanism and ex-ante risk response mechanism are included in turn, so 
that model 1, model 2, model 3 and model 4 are respectively worked out; finally, all the explanatory variables are 
included into the regression analysis process to obtain Model 5. Measurement test results show that the test results 
included in each group of explanatory variables and including all the explanatory variables, in terms of the variables
this paper is concerning about, are of no significant difference in both the size of coefficients or statistical 
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significance. It can be seen that in the main variables this paper is to investigate make robust impact on explanatory 
variables. To simplify the analysis, the following analysis is conducted mainly based on model 5.
In order to avoid the potential heteroscedasticity, the standard error in the table is the robust standard error, and
the corresponding p value is also calculated according to the robust standard error. For convenience of comparison 
of the level of the role of each independent variable, standardized disposal is conducted regression coefficients on 
model 5. The specific approach is: regression coefficient and corresponding standard deviation of the independent 
variables multiplied and then divided by the standard deviation of logistic distribution. The main independent 
variable of the econometric model in this paper is the continuous classified variable in the formed of subjective 
assignment. One obvious fact is that if these explanatory variables are assigned with different methods, the standard 
deviation will be different, and the partial effect will be certainly different; thus, here is comparison of the relative 
role of the independent variables, the ideal method is to conduct standardized disposal of the regression coefficients 
rather than to calculate the partial effect. The analysis below will be carried out mainly according to standardized 
regression coefficients.
Table 2 Results of Measurement Test (model 1-5)
Explained 
variable
I fluctuation
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
B B B B B Exp(B)
Standardized 
regression 
coefficient
CI restrict
-0.076
(0.079)
— — —
-0.049
˄0.095˅
0.952
˄0.083˅ -0.025
GR restrict
0.297
(0.299)
— — —
-0.283
˄0.271˅
0.751
˄0.216˅ -0.134
SN scale —
-0.257**
(0.112)
— —
-0.259***
˄0.113˅
0.772***
˄0.085˅ -0.161
SN income —
-0.477***
(0.129)
— —
-0.338***
˄0.153˅
0.713***
˄0.105˅ -0.128
SN quality —
0.109
(0.121)
— —
0.116
˄0.125˅
1.123
˄0.137˅ 0.062
FC restrict — —
0.047
(0.089)
—
0.047
˄0.088˅
1.048
˄0.087˅ 0.023
IC restrict — —
-0.172**
(0.080)
—
-0.233**
˄0.09˅
0.792**
˄0.076˅ -0.101
H income — —
-1.107***
(0.399)
—
-0.911**
˄0.401˅
0.402**
˄0.107˅ -0.147
CP strategy — — —
-0.381***
˄0.072˅
-0.392***
˄0.052˅
0.676***
˄0.068˅ -0.191
DP strategy — — —
-0.341***
˄0.067˅
-0.323***
˄0.063˅
0.724***
˄0.073˅ -0.168
Character
-0.387***
˄0.099˅
-0.363***
˄0.080˅
-0.384***
˄0.077˅
-0.378***
˄0.074˅
-0.373***
˄0.082˅
0.689***
(0.072)
-0.18
Age
-0.018
˄0.019˅
-0.025
˄0.018˅
-0.028
˄0.023˅
-0.023
˄0.020˅
-0.028
˄0.022˅
0.972
˄0.013˅ -0.051
H population
-0.050
˄0.071˅
-0.051
˄0.071˅
-0.097
˄0.083˅
-0.066
˄0.078˅
-0.086
˄0.083˅
0.918
˄0.076˅ -0.07
Land
-0.236***
˄0.081˅
-0.207***
˄0.067˅
-0.194***
˄0.069˅
-0.212***
˄0.079˅
-0.201***
˄0.071˅
0.818***
˄0.060˅ -0.132
Leader
-0.320*
˄0.137˅
-0.289
˄0.270˅
-0.221
˄0.252˅
-0.218
˄0.263˅
-0.118
˄0.247˅
0.889
˄0.211˅ -0.019
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Education
-0.047
˄0.038˅
-0.034
˄0.036˅
-0.045
˄0.050˅
-0.042
˄0.048˅
-0.048
˄0.056˅
0.953
˄0.026˅ -0.032
Constants
4.386***
˄0.636˅
4.900***
˄0.696˅
4.718***
˄0.656˅
4.820***
˄0.677˅
6.121***
˄0.762˅ — —
Log pseudo-
likelihood
-477.2 -478.3 -485.7 -487.2 -459.4
Wald Chi-
square
53.48*** 49.44*** 48.52*** 49.51*** 70.93***
Pseudo R 0.0562 0.055 0.050 0.049 0.083
Note: (1) *, ** and *** indicate noticeable at the statistical levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively; (2) What are included in brackets are robust 
standard errors.The impact of various independent variables is analyzed based on the regression results in case farmers face income risk, as 
follows.
5.1. Effect of the formal risk coping mechanism
Regression analysis findings show that the degree of development of the commercial insurance market makes no 
significant effect on income fluctuations as farmers face the income risk. This is because the income of farmers in 
Sichuan is still mainly from agriculture, but due to the synergy of agricultural insurance and serious asymmetry of 
information, insurance companies hold a negative attitude to the provision of agricultural insurance services. 
Government relief does not significantly affect the income fluctuation. Although the Government has implemented 
in rural areas such measures as social assistance and rural subsistence allowances in recent years, the intensity and 
scope of implementation is limited, therefore, the way to help farmers cope with income risk is insignificant. Survey 
data shows that farmers’ number of choosing the formal risk aversion mechanism accounts for only 6.4% of the total
choice, much lower than the choice ratio of other types of risk aversion mechanisms. This indicates that in case
farmers respond to the income risk, the formal risk aversion mechanism goes a little way.
5.2. Effect of the risk pooling mechanism in social networks
The size of relatives group has significant negative impacts on the income fluctuation in case farmers face the 
income risk; the odds ratio is 0.772, which indicates that the change in the number of relatives and friends of one 
class can decrease the odds ratio of income fluctuations 0.228 times (here, the odds ratio specifically means: the 
probability of significantly lowered consumption divided by that of basically unchanged consumption, below is the 
same); and the absolute value of standardized regression coefficients is quite large (0.161). This indicates that in 
rural areas of Sichuan, the network of relatives and friends plays an important role in alleviating income fluctuations.
The negative effect of the number of wealthy families in the network of relatives and friends on income fluctuations 
is very significant; the odds ratio is 0.713, indicating that every one-level increase on the number of wealthy families
in the network of relatives and friends will decrease the odds ratio over 0.287 times; the absolute value of 
standardized regression coefficient is relatively larger (0.128), which shows that the effect of the network of 
relatives and friends depends not only on the size but also on the support capability determined by the level of 
income of relatives and friends. The impact of closeness of the interaction in the friends and relatives group on 
fluctuations in income is not indistinctive, possibly because there is in fact a little difference in the closeness of the 
interaction within the relatives and friends group, not enough to make effect on the risk pooling in the social 
network, so as to bring a small impact on income fluctuations. Seen from overall, the effect of the network of 
relatives and friends on mitigation of fluctuations in the income of farmers depends on the size of the network and 
the support capability determined by the level of income of relatives and friends. However, the risk pooling in the 
social networks lacks of enforcement mechanisms; with the continuous deepening of the rural market, the 
constraints from traditional ethical ideas in rural areas have increasingly weakened, the closeness of the network of 
friends and relatives has gradually declined. These factors determine the limited role of the risk co-ordination
mechanism in social networks. Survey data shows that farmers’ rate of choosing the risk pooling mechanism in
social networks accounts for only 15.9% of the total choice, much lower than that of choosing the ex-ante risk 
238  Wang Yang / Agriculture and Agricultural Science Procedia 1 (2010) 230–240
aversion mechanism and that of choosing the inter-temporal consumption smoothing and only higher than that of 
choosing the formal risk aversion mechanism. From the foregoing analysis, Hypothesis 1 is confirmed.
5.3. Effect of inter-temporal consumption smoothing mechanism
The constraints of loans from the formal credit market to income fluctuations are not significant, indicating that
the effect of formal loans on farmer’s income risks is not significant. Currently, loans from main formal credit 
cooperatives of Sichuan rural areas are generally limited to production, negative to issue consumer loans; on the 
other hand, procedures for loans from credit unions loans are complicated, with long application period, thus it is 
difficult to help farmers cope with the income risk. These factors will influence the farmers’ dealing with the income 
risk through the formal credit. Reduced constraints of the informal credit market loans have a very significant 
negative impact on farmers’ income fluctuation; the odds ratio is 0.792, indicating every one-level decrease on the
constraints of informal loans will reduce the odds ratio of the income fluctuation 0.208 times. This shows that the 
development of the informal lending market plays a positive role in fluctuations in income of farmers. It is found 
based on a survey that there are mainly two reasons why private credit market plays a larger role than the formal 
credit market does, which are: on the one hand, lenders are in rural communities and are provided with more full 
information to accurately issue loans based on the economic strength of farmers, thus to avoid losses on bad debts;
on the other hand, private credit procedures are simple, which is helpful for farmers to cope with the income risk in 
a timely manner. However, the absolute value of standardized regression coefficient is relatively small (0.101), 
which means that the role of the informal credit market is relatively limited, mainly because farmers’ loans in the 
informal credit market are generally controlled within a low limit due to higher interest of private loans. Average 
family income level plays a significant part in income fluctuation and the odds ratio is 0.402, indicating that a rise of
10,000 Yuan in annual income of a family can decrease the odds ratio of fluctuations in income 0.598 times; the 
absolute value of standardized regression coefficient is relatively large (0.147). It shows the farmers’ assets 
accumulation level reflected by the average family income level should play a rather significant role in the income
risk. Overall, the inter-temporal consumption smoothing mechanism makes a relatively important effect on aversion 
of income risks. However, with generally low rate of savings of farmers, the savings is restricted in terms of flows in 
the formal credit market and it costs much to employ the informal private credit market. For this reason, the role of 
the inter-temporal consumption smoothing mechanism is relatively limited. Survey data shows that farmers’ rate of
choosing the inter-temporal consumption smoothing mechanism accounts for only 35.3% of the total choice, much 
lower than that of choosing the ex-ante risk aversion mechanism and higher than that of choosing the risk pooling
mechanism in social networks mechanism. From the foregoing analysis, Hypothesis 2 is confirmed.
5.4. Effect of the ex-ante risk coping mechanism
Conservative production strategies have a significant impact on income fluctuation; the odds ratio is 0.676,
indicating that one-level increase in subjective attitude to the introduction of new technologies and new varieties 
will decrease the odds ratio of income fluctuation over 0.324 times; the absolute value of standardized regression 
coefficient is relatively large (0.191). Diversified operation also has a very significant effect on the response of rural 
households to income fluctuation; the odds ratio is 0.724, which shows that one-level increase in subjective attitude
to simultaneous cultivation or feeding of a variety of agricultural products will increase the odds ratio of 0.276 times; 
the absolute value of regression coefficients is relatively large (0.168). According to the above analysis, in the 
absence of the formal risk aversion mechanism and in the context that the ex-post risk aversion mechanism is very 
limited, farmers have to take measures to avoid the income risk before it occurs. It is found that well-off farmers 
adopt less ex-ante mechanisms than farmers do to deal with the risk. This is because the wealthy ones tend to have 
more physical and financial assets, which in itself is conducive to their self-insurance, and, more assets mean more 
possibility to provide collateral to lenders, or to be used as the signal conveying its operation. This makes more 
access to loans. As a result, as the less wealthy give consideration to risk issues during obtaining income, the higher 
the degree of specialization will be, the more positive the attitude to new technologies and new market opportunities
is, the higher the production and management efficiency will be achieved. For the poor, it is another case. Such a 
mechanism would play a role repeatedly so that the income gap continuously widens. Obviously, the more the 
farmers are in lack of the ex-post risk mechanism, the more evident the widening of such difference is. And more 
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importantly, the lower the income level of farmers is, the more they are likely to adopt theex-ante risk aversion 
measures. And this will lead to a vicious circle of poverty. Survey data shows that farmers who have low income are 
apt to adopt theex-ante mechanism to cope with the income fluctuation. The number that farmers choose theex-ante 
risk response mechanism to cope with the income fluctuation accounts for 42.4% of the total choice, the highest 
among the percentage of various risk aversion measures, which proves the conclusion reached by Dercon. In
summery, Hypothesis 3 is confirmed.
5.5. Effect of family characteristics variable
The regression analysis results show that the degree of farmers’ optimism has a significant effect on the farmers 
income fluctuation, and the odds ratio is 0.689, which means that each one-level increase in the degree of farmers’ 
optimism causes a reduce in the income fluctuation by 0.311; the absolute value of regression coefficients is 
relatively large (0.180). This indicates that subjective factors do have influence on the income fluctuation perceived 
by farmers, and that the variable has effectively controlled the subjective factors. The number of agricultural land 
plays a significant and positive part in income fluctuation, and the odds ratio is 0.818, meaning that a one-mu
increase in per capita cultivated land of a family will reduce the odds ratio of income fluctuations 0.182 times. The 
absolute value of regression coefficients is relatively large (0.132) and this shows that the agricultural land plays an 
important role in helping farmers cope with the income risk, functioning as insurance for farmers. Regression 
analysis results also show that the older farmers, bigger family size, the higher level of educational background and 
the position of rural cadre provide farmers more ability to cope with the income risk, but these effects are not 
significant.
Finally, two concerns about the above models are: (1) whether the income level may be related to the social 
networks and the degree of difficulty in borrowing and lending? (2) Whether the variables in the above models used 
to reflect the personality characteristics of the head of a household (how often farmers consider the future accidents) 
reflect the time preference, and thus make effects on the consumption smoothing mechanism? From the 
measurement models we try to get rid of the income and the variables used to reflect the characteristics of the head 
of a household, and work out two new models respectively. Measurement results of the new model show that, the 
removal of the two variables has made some influence on the size and p value of the coefficient of related 
explanatory variables to a low extent. The main conclusions made through the foregoing analysis still stand. These 
facts further prove that conclusions reached under the model 5 are robust. Moreover, the absolute value of likelihood 
function log (Log pseudo-likelihood) of two new models becomes bigger, this means that the value of the likelihood 
function becomes smaller and the degree of fitting turns worse. This shows that the income variables and variables
of personality characteristics of the head of a household have an independent role in explaining the fluctuations in 
income of farmers.
6. Conclusion and Suggestion
Based on the above-mentioned analysis, following conclusions may be drawn up: (1) as the formal risk aversion 
mechanism has little effect, farmers adopt multiple informal ways to avoid the income risk in three types of forms, 
including the risk pooling in the social network, inter-temporal consumption smoothing andex-ante risk response 
measures;(2) ex-post risk aversion mechanism may to some extent facilitate farmers to cope with the income risk; 
however, the mechanism is functionally limited due to a variety of constraints. (3) Against the background of the 
lack of formal risk response mechanism and that the ex-post risk response mechanism is functionally limited, 
farmers have to rely on the ex-ante risk response mechanism to deal with the income risk, or are forced to bear the 
results from the income risk after the occurrence of the risk, which will cause the reduction of the efficiency of 
agricultural production and operation and the vicious circle of poverty. For the long term, the ex-ante risk aversion 
mechanism chosen at large by farmers is not conducive to the stable increase of their income and the continuous
development of rural economy. Therefore, it is of great significance to provide farmers with assistance to address 
the income risk in better methods. 
Based on the above conclusions, some policy advices are brought forward as follows. First, constantly increase 
the social capital for farmers to meet the market economy so as to strengthen the ability of farmers to cope with the 
income risk and reduce the frangibility of farmers; second, improve rural financial services, reduce constraints for 
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farmer credits, and enhance the ability of farmers to handle the income risk through the inter-temporal consumption 
smoothing; at last, further improve the standard of the rural social security and help the poor farmers maintain the 
basic living standards; provide the enterprises that are engaged in rural insurance service with subsidies granted for 
policy considerations and reasonable profits; decrease the level of agricultural insurance
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